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THE MERGER OF LAW AND MEDIATION:
LESSONS FROM EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
AND ROSCOE POUND
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley *
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost one hundred years ago, Roscoe Pound' warned about
the decline of equity jurisprudence in the American legal system.2
He called this phenomenon the "decadence of equity."' 3 Though
Pound offered several causes for this decline,4 what we know today
as "institutionalization" in the court system was the primary sus-
pect. "The very thing that made equity a system must, in the end,
prove fatal to it. In the very act of becoming a system, it becomes
legalized, and in becoming merely a competing system of law in-
sures its ultimate downfall." 5 While Pound acknowledged that he
saw some good from the "refinements" of equity, he rejected what
he labeled the "perversions" that resulted from its being swallowed
up by law.6
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director of the Fordham ADR &
Conflict Resolution Program, and Graduate Studies Program. I would like to thank my friend
and colleague, Catherine M. A. McCauliff, for sharing with me her immense knowledge of En-
glish Legal History, my research assistant, Elizabeth Frayer, for her excellent assistance and
Fordham Law School for its financial support for this project.
I Roscoe Pound is considered one of the most significant leaders in American jurispru-
dence for his development of a progressive, sociological approach to law and judicial deci-
sion-making. His sociological approach is identified with the philosophy of Pragmatism.
See generally, N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel
to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L. J. 1302 (1989).
2 See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1905).
3 Explaining this somewhat provocative description of equity, Pound wrote: "It may
surprise at first thought in this era of liberal law, when the equity dockets of our courts are
overloaded and some even think we are in danger of being governed by courts of equity,
that any one should assert there is such a phenomenon as the decadence of equity. But we
all see and know that the separate system of equity has been for a long time on the decline,
and so much of the substance of law has always been wrapped up in procedure that we
should be justified in anticipating grave effects. My purpose is to show that these effects
have accrued and are accruing, and that the decadence of equity as a system is involving
the decadence of a substantial element in our legal institutions." Id. at 25.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 25. Pound was also concerned with the procedural effects of the blending of
law and equity. Id. at 28.
6 See id. at 28.
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Pound is no stranger to the alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) community. His influential address to the American Bar
Association in 1906, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice,7 challenged the bar to reform the existing
legal regime.8 This speech was commemorated at the 1976 Pound
Conference that launched the modern ADR movement.9 Perhaps
less known, but equally significant today, are Pound's serious con-
cerns about equity's loss of core values as they merged with com-
mon law into one court system. Pound cited as examples the facts
that legal rules were superseding equitable rules in some cases, and
that equitable rules were either disappearing, becoming rigid in
their application, or being adopted in ways that confused rather
than supplemented legal rules.10 Pound feared that the submer-
gence of equity into one court system would result in a loss of the
discretion and flexibility that characterized equitable jurisprudence
and distinguished it from the common law's rigidity.11 Almost one
hundred years later, scholars echo the same sentiment.12
Pound's concerns about the state of equity jurisprudence reso-
nate with modern ADR scholars, who worry about the effects of
blending settlement with adjudication 13 and mediation with the
law.' 4 His observations are particularly instructive for those who
work in court-connected mediation programs because of the his-
toric parallels between equity and mediation. Both equity and me-
diation offer a form of "individualized justice" unavailable in the
official legal system, and each allow room for mercy in an other-
7 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, Address Before the American Bar Association Convention (Aug. 26, 1906), 35 F.R.D.
273 (1964).
8 Pound's sociological orientation argued for a more pragmatic view of law that would
be responsive to social, economic and political currents. Id. at 273, 277-78. See also Hull,
supra note 1, at 1308.
9 See The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (A. Levine & R.
Wheeler eds. (1979)) (proceedings of the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice).
10 See Pound, supra note 2, at 29.
11 See Pound, supra note 2, at 24, 26.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 50-55.
13 See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J.
27 (2003).
14 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991); Dr.
Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected
Mediation, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 241, 244, 245-46 (2002).
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wise rigid, rule-bound justice system. 5 Equity jurisprudence devel-
oped to remedy the harshness of common law rules, yet scholars
today question whether equity is still equitable. 16 Mediation was
institutionalized in courts over the last twenty-five years, in part to
provide access to justice that was otherwise unavailable in the civil
justice system. Some scholars question whether this institutional-
ization offers anything that looks like justice.' 7
Pound's thoughts on the decline of equity prompt me to con-
sider whether mediation, as practiced in the courts today, is headed
in the same direction. I wonder whether one hundred years from
now, a future generation of ADR scholars may gather to reflect on
the disappearance of mediation under a unified regime of law and
mediation. At present, my questions are grounded more pragmati-
cally. Has court-connected mediation lost its way on the road to
justice? Has mediation become so intertwined with litigation and
adjudication as to be indistinguishable from judicial settlement
processes or traditional bilateral negotiations?18 If so, what are the
implications for achieving justice in mediation?
In looking for instructive lessons from the past, I am mindful
of the inherent limitations of engaging in "history lite."' 9 There-
15 The difference between law and equity can be conceptualized as the difference be-
tween justice and mercy. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
Aiv. 83 (1993). Strict legal justice is available under the law and rules; mercy is available in
the form of equitable relief.
16 See Stephen N. Subrin, THE EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE TO PROCEDURE BASED IN EQ-
uiTy: How CAN EQUITv PROCEDURE BE MADE MORE EQUITABLE? Equity and Contem-
porary Legal Developments, First International Conference on Equity 761 (Stephen
Goldstein, ed., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 1990) [hereinafter Subrin, EMPIRI-
CAL CHALLENGE].
17 See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Mini-
mizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359
(1985).
18 In connection with the blending of ADR with traditional processes such as adjudica-
tion, Professor Judith Resnick discusses a "third mode of civil processing ... that melds
aspects of privately-based dispute resolution with the public processes.... The legalization
of private processes brings with it professional domination and greater complexity, making
these processes mimic adjudication and collapse into it." Judith Resnick, For Owen M. Fiss:
Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173,
191 (2003).
19 My colleague, Martin Flaherty, describes "history lite" in the context of American
constitutional history and critiques those for whom the use of history is dispositive in set-
tling questions. Arguing that "constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions
that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers," Flaherty calls for more rigorous
research and the use of primary sources. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Lite in Modern
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525 (1995).
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fore, I offer these preliminary reflections in the nature of a caution-
ary tale by a critical, internal participant. The conflicting views of
justice that are developing under the current regime of blended law
and mediation suggest that more deliberation and caution is in or-
der. Pound's observation of the state of justice in 1906 is equally
relevant almost one hundred years later:
Justice, which is the end of law, is the ideal compromise between
the activities of each and the activities of all in a crowded world.
The law seeks to harmonize these activities and to adjust the
relations of every man with his fellows so as to accord with the
moral sense of the community. When the community is at one
in its ideas of justice, this is possible. When the community is
divided and diversified, and groups and classes and interests, un-
derstanding each other none too well, have conflicting ideas of
justice, the task is extremely difficult.2"
II. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
A. Conceptual Understanding
Equity, like mediation, is a difficult concept to define with
specificity. In its popular sense, equity is a notion of natural jus-
tice, or a determination of what is right and just between individu-
als.21 Aristotle regarded equity as a corrective to the general laws 22
and a form of justice that was superior to and in tension with strict
legal justice.23 Equity is frequently associated with ideas of fair-
ness, discretion, natural justice, and good conscience - concepts
that scholars refer to as anti-legal elements. 24 Unsurprisingly, eq-
uity has been conceived of as justice without law.25 Equity also
20 Pound, supra note 7, at 276.
21 See WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 1-2 (5th ed. 1956).
22 See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 105 (4th ed.
2002).
23 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. An'. 83, 96 (1993).
24 See Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 429, n.191 (2003).
25 See Pound, supra note 2, at 24.
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offers "individualized" justice,26 moderating the rigidity of law by
integrating ideas of fairness and morality into the legal system.27
B. Historical Background
The legal system of equity originated and developed outside
the common law courts of England to provide relief that was un-
available in common law courts.28 The origins of equity jurispru-
dence lie in the development of the Chancery Courts of England,
where parties would seek relief from the Chancellor to prevent
wrongs or injuries, or to specifically enforce rights. The Chancery
was considered a court of conscience.29 Unlike the common law
courts' practice of viewing law as a set of rules that could be objec-
tively applied to specific facts, the Chancellor incorporated the
roles of judge and jury.30 By focusing on the specific circumstances
of cases and following his conscience, the Chancellor exercised
considerable discretion.3 1 The relief given strived for justice32 and
was considered superior to the form of justice available in the com-
mon law courts.3 3 Ultimately, this form of justice acquired the la-
bel "equity."34
By the middle of the 17th century, as Chancery courts began
reporting cases on a regular basis, equity became expressed
through a set of principles, and ultimately became a separate legal
system.3 5 Common law and equity procedures developed in En-
gland as complementary systems. Equity was invoked only when
there was no adequate remedy at law and when a party would be
26 See Main, supra note 24, at 476-77. Main explains this principle as "[r]eflected in the
evolution of broad principles as opposed to narrow rules, broad grants of discretionary
authority, variable standards of conduct, balancing tests, the (lee) ways of precedent, and
the acceptance of legal fictions." Id. at 476-477 (citations omitted).
27 See Main, supra note 24, at 430.
28 See DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION 66-
74 (1993). See also DEFUNIAK, supra note 21, at 1-5.
29 Baker, supra note 22, at 106.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 105-106.
32 There were moral overtones to equity jurisdiction, which was said to act upon an
individual's conscience requiring her to do her duty in specific situations. DEFUNIAK,
supra note 21, at 11.
33 See Baker, supra note 22, at 106.
34 Equity, however, was not a novel concept. In addition to Aristotle, who wrote of it,
medieval lawyers were familiar with equity. See Baker, supra note 22, at 106.
35 See Baker, supra note 22, at 110.
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irreparably harmed without equitable intervention.36 The themes
of fair play and good conscience run through the development of
equity and are reflected in many of the general equitable maxims:
(1) Equity does not suffer a wrong to go without a remedy; (2)
Equity regards substance rather than form; (3) Equity regards as
done that which ought to be done; (4) Equality is equity;37 (5) One
who comes into equity must come with clean hands; (6) One who
seeks equity must do equity.38 While these maxims did not have
the effect of law, they represented the ethical aspirations of equity
courts.3 9
The early settlers brought the English dual system of equity
and law to the United States. In an effort to avoid the complicated
aspects of a bifurcated system, several American states began to
experiment by merging law and equity into one court and provid-
ing for only one form of action.40 The most significant reform ef-
fort, developed in New York State, was the influential Field Code
that simplified pleading and practice by abolishing the distinction
between law and equity.41 In the United States, the merger of law
and equity was accomplished in federal courts in 1938 with the Su-
preme Court's promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.42  The rigid pleading rules and technicalities that
characterized the common law were replaced with more simplified
procedures of equity. The civil litigation system was now theoreti-
cally balanced with the discretionary and flexible characteristics of
equity and the certainty provided by common law rules.43
36 See Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 KAN. L. REV.
347, 360 (2003).
37 Professor Baker explains this principle: "The essence of equity as a corrective to the
rigour of laws was that it should not be tied to rules. If, on the other hand, no consistent
principles whatever were observed, parties in like cases would not be treated alike; and
equality was a requisite of equity." Baker, supra note 22, at 109.
38 See DOBBS, supra note 28, at 83 n.7 (quoting G. KEETON, INTRODUCTION TO EouITY
87-117 (6th ed. 1965)).
39 See DOBBS, supra note 28, at 83.
40 See DeFuniak, supra note 21, at 6-7.
41 See Sward, supra note 36, at 382-83.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 2, adopted pursuant to order of Supreme Court, Dec. 20, 1937. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 2 Advisory Comm. Note.
43 See Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and
Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV.L. J. 196, 197 (2002/2003).
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C. Equity Today
Despite the merger of law and equity in most judicial systems,
the distinction between legal and equitable remedies retains some
significance. The common law still retains the constitutional right
to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment44 when
the remedy sought is purely legal.45 Jury trial is not granted for
equitable remedies.46 The distinction between legal and equitable
remedies may also have some significance in the traditional under-
standing that equitable relief is discretionary,47 while legal reme-
dies enforce rights.48 Finally, as a general rule, unlike legal
remedies, equitable remedies may be enforced by contempt. 49
Modern critiques of equity jurisprudence echo Pound's con-
cerns about the extent to which equity has become subsumed by
law with the resulting diminution of individualized justice.5" Pro-
fessor Stephen Subrin51 argues that neither the result-oriented
goals of a good procedural system relating to efficiency, predict-
ability, and the vindication of substantive rights, nor the process
goals of dignity and respect are met in the unified system of law
and equity.52 He calls for a return of equity to its former comple-
mentary role with litigation. Other scholars, particularly in the
context of mass tort litigation, have warned against the hardships
and "mischief" that resulted from a unified system of law and eq-
uity, wherein the rigid application of rules deprives judges of suffi-
cient discretion to do equity.54 The demise of equity has been
noted in England as well. In commenting on the current state of
44 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
45 In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987), the Supreme Court offered a
two-part test to determine whether parties have the right to a jury trial: a) comparison of
the action to 18th century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of
the courts of law and equity; b) examination of the remedy sought and a determination of
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.
46 See DOBBS, supra note 28, at 11.
47 It is well established that when a party seeks equitable relief, the courts have broad
powers to deny relief completely, or to give partial or full relief. In exercising discretion,
courts balance the needs of the public and those of third parties. See DOBBS, supra note 28,
at 90-92.
48 See id. at 12.
49 See id. at 11.
50 See Subrin, Empirical Challenge, supra note 16; Mains, supra note 24.
51 Civil Procedure scholar, Stephen N. Subrin, is a Professor of Law at Northeastern
University.
52 See Subrin, Empirical Challenge, supra note 16.
53 Id.
54 Main, supra note 24, at 487-88.
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Chancery courts and equity, English legal historian Professor
Baker has observed a paradoxical situation: "as the equity of the
Chancery has hardened into law, so the law has been dissolving
into something like abstract equity, with a consequent loss of clar-
ity and certainty. 55
III. MEDIATION, EQUITY, AND THE PROMISE OF
INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
The traditional understanding of mediation that focuses on its
relational aspects is expressed in Professor Lon Fuller's 56 descrip-
tion of mediation's "capacity to reorient the parties towards each
other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a per-
ception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward
one another. ' 57 Since the publication of Fuller's article over thirty-
one years ago, the practice of mediation 8 has evolved to accom-
modate a diverse range of mediator and party expectations,59
which are highly dependent on context.60 Mediation discourse to-
day focuses on many values, from empowerment to efficiency,
while the relational story is less prominent.
There are historic parallels between mediation and equity that
are relevant in shaping our present ideas about justice. Mediation,
like equity, was conceived of as justice without law.61 Mediation
55 Baker, supra note 22, at 115.
56 Lon Fuller is one of the most influential American scholars in the fields of contracts,
legal theory and legal philosophy. As a legal process theorist, Fuller crafted a unique juris-
prudence of procedural natural law and is considered one of the most significant jurispru-
dential thinkers in the field of ADR. See generally, James Boyle, Legal Realism and the
Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1993).
57 Lon Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
58 I refer here to North American-style mediation that is frequently perceived as rights-
based and rule-bound. See John D. Feerick, The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator, 2003
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RES. 229 (2003) (discussing a conversation with a South African
mediator about his perception of American-style mediation).
59 I refer here to the enormous literature generated around Professor Leonard Riskin's
evaluative-facilitative grid, describing mediator behaviors that was first published in 1996
in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review, and most recently revisited and modified by Pro-
fessor Riskin in Decision Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New Grid Sys-
tem, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003).
60 For example, whether disputes are legal or non-legal, and where mediation occurs in
court or out of court.
61 See JEROLD S. AUERBACK, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 117-19 (1983).
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also offers the possibility of individualized justice, which may be in
tension with strict legal justice. 62 Just as equity moderated the ri-
gidity of the common law by integrating fairness and moral values
into the judicial process,63 mediation offers fair alternatives to legal
values and judicial decision-making. 64 Though scholars may disa-
gree on the meaning of fairness in mediation,65 substantive and
procedural fairness remain its primary and enduring values. 66 Nu-
merous professional codes require mediators to insure that agree-
ments are fair according to prevailing social standards.67 Scholars
have suggested ways of promoting fairness in mediation, 68 and par-
ties participating in mediation express satisfaction with such fair-
ness in the process. Finally, just as equity offered relief from harsh
pleading and procedural rules that operated to deny disputants jus-
tice in the common law courts, mediation offers relief from the ri-
gidity of a rules-bound justice system. It provides opportunities for
individualized justice through the exercise of party self-determina-
tion69 and the expression of dignitary values.7 ° While we may dif-
fer on the extent to which self-determination is over-valued and
the extent to which procedural justice is undervalued in current
versions of court mediation practice, these principles nonetheless
support a framework for the realization of individualized justice in
mediation.
62 See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 63 (1996) [hereinafter "Court Mediation"].
63 See Main, supra note 24, at 430.
64 In some cases, the possibility of seeking justice through mediation is a more attrac-
tive option than adjudication. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hyman and Lela P. Love, If Portia
Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 177 (2002).
65 Compare the views of Professor Frank Sander, Introduction, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 791, 792 (1998) with Professor Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 909 (1998).
66 See Stulberg, supra note 65.
67 See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 703, 764-67 (1997).
68 See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rodgers and Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Media-
tion, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317 (1995).
69 In Fuller's view, mediation gave parties an opportunity to create their own norms,
rather than follow existing ones. Boyle, supra note 56, at 308.
70 See Nancy Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice [hereinafter "Disputants' Decision Control"],
2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 179, 180 (discussing empirical research on procedural justice).
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A. De-Facto Merger of Law and Mediation
The institutionalization of mediation in courts71 and federal
agencies 72 is taken for granted today. The wholesale integration of
mediation into our civil procedure points toward a de-facto merger
of law and mediation. While less formal than the official merger of
law and equity, it is nonetheless real. Perhaps more than any other
ADR process, mediation has easily blended into the civil justice
system and is greatly accepted. In a recent symposium, Professor
Stephen Subrin acknowledged that mediation is "a major portion
of the new era of civil procedure" and, as a former ADR skeptic,
cautiously endorsed this development.73
The de-facto merger of mediation and law has altered the way
individualized justice is delivered and perceived. Professor John
Lande 7  has appropriately described the contemporary legal land-
scape as a "liti-mediation" environment where it has become ac-
cepted practice that "mediation is the normal way to end
litigation. ' 75 Parties participate in court mediation programs with
pre-mediation consultations, document and brief submissions,76
and telephonic appearances. 77 The number of federal trials has
been greatly reduced 78 and, at the same time, the role of judge as
71 See, e.g., The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58,
652(a), requires federal district courts to provide litigants with access to at least one ADR
process.
72 See Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. Disv. RESOL. 79; Daniel
Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal Government. Not Such Strange Bedfel-
lows After All, 66 Mo. L. REV. 709 (2001).
73 Subrin, supra note 43, at 198.
74 Professor John Lande, a dispute resolution scholar, teaches at the University of Mis-
souri - Columbia, where he directs the LL.M. Program in Dispute Resolution.
75 John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (1997).
76 Some judges request mediation "briefs" in which parties are requested to advance
their major arguments. See Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEVADA
L. J. 232, 235 (2002/2003).
77 See Daniel Wise, In Test, Lawyers May 'Appear' By Telephone, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 2,
2004 at 17, col. 4 (reporting about a newly instituted practice in New York where judges
and mediators allow attorneys to make certain types of court appearances by telephone).
See also Bay Area Luxury Homes/Stevick I, LLC v. Lee, 2003 WL 22664648 (Cal. App.,
Nov., 2003) (holding telephonic appearance at pre-litigation mediation session permitted)
(discussed in ABA Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004 at 29).
78 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mat-
ters in Federal and State Court, American Bar Association (2003), available at http://www.
abanet.org/litigation/litnews/taskforce/cji/nosearch/galanter.zip (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
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mediator is growing.79 Thus, the de-facto merger of law and medi-
ation presents a paradoxical situation that is aptly described by
Professor Subrin, who observed that "[a]t the same time that medi-
ation begins to look more like adjudication in its attention to law
application, judges, who eschew the actual trial of cases, have be-
come more like mediators. '8 0 While it is not clear that mediation is
the reason for this shift in judicial gears, the omnipresence of medi-
ation in court certainly has something to do with it."l
B. Is This the Decadence of Mediation?
The profile of mediation that emerges from what I have de-
scribed as the de-facto merger of law and mediation in the formal
legal system is a departure from the traditional understanding of
mediation as a relational process.82 This departure diminishes the
potential for achieving individualized justice in mediation and it
prompts me to reformulate Pound's provocative question about eq-
uity: Are we headed towards the decadence of mediation?
Mediation is both more public and more private than we have
really acknowledged. Parties are theoretically empowered to fash-
ion their own justice. Of course, such empowerment has always
been the case with the traditional practice of pre-trial negotiation
settlement efforts by attorneys, but the pre-trial settlement culture
worked voluntarily. Large-scale mandated civil case mediation is a
whole new ball game played in private, but on very public playing
fields - the courts. In the words of one critic, it is a "new and
largely unregulated industry that operates, by design, behind
closed doors."83
Consider what is happening behind closed doors. Despite the
prevalence of "good" mediation practice, there is considerable
79 See Brunet, supra note 76. If Owen Fiss was right that "adjudication is the social
process by which judges give meaning to our public values," (see Owen M. Fiss, The Su-
preme Court 1978 Term, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979)),
then under a de-facto merger of law and mediation, judicial mediation may well become
the process by which judges also give meaning to private values. What does this do to the
notion of individualized justice?
80 Subrin, supra note 43, at 228.
81 See id. at 223. But see James E. McGuire and Frank E. A. Sander. Some Questions
About "The Vanishing Trial," ABA Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, 17, 18. "ADR may
deserve both credit and blame for this phenomenon." Id. at 17.
82 See Fuller, supra note 56.
83 Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 187 (2003).
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room for improvement in programs where the pressures to settle in
mediation are sufficiently strong that parties never get to the public
forum of a courtroom,84 especially in cases where the accountabil-
ity of neutrals is questionable or where ethical conduct is suspect.
Reports of coercion, threats, strong-arming, and other abusive be-
haviors by mediators and attorneys 5 suggest that the privacy of
mediation has created space for behaviors that would hardly be
tolerated in public courtrooms.86
One response to these behaviors is legislation that requires
parties and their attorneys to act in good faith in mediation. 7 Such
legislative intervention into mediation practice has generated a del-
uge of bad faith litigation 88 to weed out the bad apples. This is a
complicated project however, because of the strong, almost sacred,
protection for mediation confidentiality. 89
How do we assess legislative efforts to make mediation fair?
Pound would probably suggest that the very need to engage in such
an assessment could be a sign of the decadence of mediation. In
his equity essay, citing an example of the unconscionable benefi-
ciaries who were allowed to use equitable principles to do injustice
until the legislature intervened, Pound commented: "When a stat-
ute is necessary to make equity do equity and to prevent its doc-
trines from working wrong and oppression, we may well speak of
decadence in this connection."'9 While we might not go so far as
Pound, perhaps we could say with some assurance that when legis-
84 This situation exists with programs that impose financial penalties if the trial out-
come does not exceed the proposed mediation settlement by a certain amount. Craig A.
McEwen and Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through Courts and Medi-
ation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 865, 874 (1998) (discussing Michigan's mediation
statutes).
85 See James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991).
86 See, e.g., Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094 (2001); Allen v. Leal, 27 F.
Supp.2d 945 (1998). See also cases discussed in Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients
and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. RF-v. 1369 (1998); Macfarlane, supra note 14, at 275
(discussing similar concerns in Canada).
87 See John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Par-
ticipation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. Rav. 69 (2002).
88 See Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 367, 368
(summarizing good- faith literature into the pro-sanctions, anti-sanctions and moderates).
89 See Maureen Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
29, 30-34. See also Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All
Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceed-
ings Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 135, 162-63.
90 Pound, supra note 2, at 27.
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latures are required to intervene for mediation to be fair, such in-
tervention is a sign that some mediation practitioners have missed
the point.91
A second aspect of mediation "decadence" relates to the uni-
queness of mediation as a dispute resolution process. Mediation
offers a distinctive conception of justice that is, like equity, the face
of mercy.92 As a process, it has the capacity to acknowledge the
emotional, psychological, and spiritual needs of parties, including
the need to reconcile, to forgive, and to be forgiven. This aspect of
individualized justice is in danger of being lost as mediation be-
comes a predominantly rule-bound process so blended in the legal
system that its relational underpinnings evaporate. 93 With the de-
mise of the relational emphasis in mediation, apology94 and for-
giveness become merely perfunctory actions. As scholars have
argued in other settings, the possibility of apology and reconcilia-
tion are "cheap grace" without relational understandings. 95
My final "decadence" inquiry looks to the past. Historically,
there have been costs associated with blending mercy and justice,
not the least of which is that something tends to be lost in the pro-
cess. In the case of equity, the fair and "equitable" became con-
sumed by rules. In the case of mediation, the fair and relational
are consumed by rules and by an instrumentalist conception that
views mediation simply as an efficient tool in the administration of
91 See Lande, supra note 87.
92 See Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation, supra note 62, at 84-85 (discussing the equitable
perspective in mediation).
93 See Thomas 0. Main, "An Overwhelming Question" About Non-Formal Procedure, 3
NEVADA LAW J. 388, 390 (Winter 2002/2003) (stating that "alternative methods have begun
to ossify and formalize in a manner reminiscent of their traditional antecedents."). Id.
94 A developing literature explores the rich potential of the use of apology in media-
tion. See, e.g., Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the
Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 829 (2003); Jonathan R. Cohen,
Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002); Erin Ann O'Hara
and Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilence, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); Deborah
L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997); see also, Jen-
nifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Apology in Negotiation, 87 MARO. L. REV. 665 (2004).
95 See Nancy Berlinger, Avoiding Cheap Grace: Medical Harm, Patient Safety, and the
Culture(s) of Forgiveness, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33, No. 6 (2003) 28, 29. Berlinger
borrows the term "cheap grace" from Christian theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer to con-
struct a relational understanding of forgiveness in the medical context. She refers to the
relational character of forgiveness as "the actions that various actors undertake in relation
to one another so forgiveness can take place." This stands in contrast to a "cheap grace,"
non-relational approach "that in formulating forgiveness as automatic, either acknowl-
edges no role for the injured person as agent of forgiveness, or assumes that this person
should offer forgiveness in the absence of disclosure, apology, accountability, compensa-
tion, or other goods that we might place under the principles of justice." Id. at 29.
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justice, devoid of the intrinsic values that brought it to court in the
first place.96
IV. CONCLUSION
Lessons from equity's merger with law are out there for the
taking. If court-connected mediation is to offer alternatives to
traditional rule-bound justice, it must return to its complementary
role to litigation and adjudication. This is easier said than done.
Mediation is so deeply entangled in the justice system that it is dif-
ficult to categorize it as a distinct entity. But that is precisely what
we need to do to recapture mediation's potential for individualized
justice as a real alternative to rules-bound justice.
As a way to engage the rehabilitation process, I offer a few
suggestions for which I make no claim to originality. First, we
should be careful about labeling court-connected dispute resolu-
tion processes. When magistrates and judges conduct settlement
conferences, and where heavy-handed evaluation takes place, we
should hesitate before giving such processes the label "mediation."
Second, the increasingly coercive nature of evaluative mediation
needs to be monitored with efforts to develop safeguards for re-
ducing and preventing it.97 Finally, the dignity values associated
with procedural justice should always be part of court-connected
mediation. 98 In this regard, we need to pay more attention to how
we train lawyers who represent parties in mediation, emphasizing
the importance of honoring the principle of informed consent99 and
the legitimacy of client voice.100 Returning mediation to its com-
96 Recent discussions on the possibilities of restorative justice and healing through me-
diation are hopeful signs. See Symposium at Hamline Law School, Intentional Conversa-
tions about Restorative Justice, Mediation on and the Practice of Law, Nov. 1-2 (2003).
Symposium bibliography available at http://www.hamline.edu/law/adr/symposium/2003-
Symposium_- BIBLIOGRAPHY.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2004).
97 See Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation, supra note 62; Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Ver-
sion of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institu-
tionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 788-92 (2000).
98 See Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control, supra note 70, at 838-58 (listing suggestions
for ways in which procedural justice values should be incorporated into court mediation).
99 I have explored this issue more fully in an earlier article. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decision-
making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999).
100 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 86, at 1369. While recent scholarship demonstrates the
value that lawyers can add to negotiation and mediation, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Panacea or
Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2003), Jean
Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychol-
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plementary role with litigation does not exclude it from an honora-
ble place in the justice system. Rather, it encourages vigilance in
keeping mediation's core values and relational character intact.101
Vigilance was the theme of Pound's final message with respect
to the decline of equity, and it is surely a sensible approach for
court mediation at this time.
Are we, then to condemn the reform which has given us one
procedure instead of two, which allows litigants to adjust their
disputes in one case instead of two..? Surely not .... The moral,
I take it, is simply that we must be vigilant.10 2
ogy to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIo ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 269
(1999), lawyers can also impede the relational aspect of mediation. See "The Interface
Between Negotiation Theory and Mediation Practice," at http://www.law.missouri.edu/aal
sadr/Syllabi/lnterface BetweenNegTheory_&_MedPractice.htm (last visited Nov. 24,
2004).
101 Here, I agree with Jean Sternlight and other scholars who have suggested that a
broader conception of justice, including personal and emotional needs, should be part of
our system of law. See Jean R. Sternlight, ADR In A System of Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289,
299 n.57 (2002/2003).
102 Pound, supra note 2, at 35.

